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INTRODUCTION

According to a 2016 Pew Research Report on Social Media Use, seventynine percent of online Americans use Facebook and twenty-four percent use
Twitter, in addition to a host of other platforms.' Facebook alone boasts over
2 billion users.2 The content posted by users range from the frivolous to
offensive.3 Employers now take a more reactionary role in response to online
employee behavior because of heightened visibility and instantaneous spread
of social media posts. 4 As a result, anecdotal tales of people losing their jobs
because of social media continue to increase.5 In some instances it makes
perfect sense for an employee to lose her job if she reveals confidential
customer information, brags about using drugs at work, or threatens her
employer with violence. 6 Yet, there are also instances in which an employee

1.See Shannon Greenwood, et al., Social Media Update 2016: Facebook Usage and
Engagement Is on the Rise, While Adoption of Other Platforms Holds Steady, PEW

(Nov. 11, 2016) https://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/1 l/social-mediaupdate-2016/ (citing increasing trend in Facebook usage).
2. See Kathleen Chaykowski, Mark Zuckerberg: 2 Billion Users Means Facebook's
RESEARCH CTR.

'Responsibility is Expanding',

FORBES

(Jun.27,2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/

kathleenchaykowski/2017/06/27/facebook-officially-hits-2-billion-users/#22fe5f1 837
08 (chronicling Facebook's large user base and plans for expansion).
3. See Jon Ronson, How One Stupid Tweet Blew Up Justine Sacco's Life, N.Y.

(Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/magazine/how-onestupid-tweet-ruined-justine-saccos-life.html
(describing
how
a
corporate
communications director lost her job after tweeting "Going to Africa. Hope I don't get
AIDS. Just Kidding. I'm white!").
TIMES

4. See Stacy Rapacon, How using Social Media can get you Fired,CNBC (Feb. 5,

2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/05/how-using-social-media-can-get-you-fired.
html (claiming twenty-eight percent of employers report firing people for using the
internet for non-work-related activity and eighteen percent of employers dismiss
employees because of social media posts).
5. See Lydia Price, 20 Tales of Employees Who Were Fired Because of Social
Media, PEOPLE (Jul. 8, 2016), http://people.com/celebrity/employees-who-were-fired-

because-of-social-media-posts/ (describing people fired for making posts about illicit
drug use, plans to quit after using up sick leave, and crude humor).
6. See id. (referencing social media usage that merits termination).
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is fired for expressing a viewpoint that her employer finds controversial or
offensive.
Additional problems arise when an employer fires an employee because
her employer learns of her private actions on social media either through a
third-party or by voluntary admission.8 Juli Briskman's employer fired her
after she learned of a viral photo on Facebook depicting Juli flashing the
middle finger at the President's motorcade. 9 Her employer terminated her
because of its status as a government contractor and the negative publicity
associated with the image.'0 Juli's is another in a long line of First
Amendment public employer disputes in which an employer takes issue with
the content of an employee's speech."
This Comment explores the limitations of First Amendment speech
protections in public employment when applied to social media.'2 It argues
that opprobrious, offensive, and rude online speech warrants First
Amendment protection in social media cases because the government
generally may not censor discourse in public places merely because others
7. See Aliah D. Wright, Firedfor Facebooking:Nasty PoliticalPosts Could Cost
Employees Their Jobs, Soc'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (Sep. 26, 2016), https://www.
shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/technology/pages/fired-for-facebooking-nastypolitical-posts-could-cost-employees-their-jobs.aspx (warning employees to limit
controversial and offensive posts on social media).
8. See Dan Ivers, Court Upholds Firingof PatersonTeacher who Called Students
'FutureCriminals',NJ.COM (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.nj.com/bergen/index.ssf/2013/
01/court upholds firing ofpaterson teacher who called students future criminals.
html (explaining how a teacher's former principal forwarded her Facebook post to her
current employer).
9. See Maya Oppenheim, Government contractorfiredfor giving Donald Trump
thefinger considering suing employer, THE INDEPENDENT (Nov. 25, 2017), http://www.
independent.co .uk/news/world/americas/juli-briskman-fired-trump-middle-fingermotorcade-a807469 1.html (recounting how Briskman lost her job because of an image
that went viral on social media).
10. See id. (chronicling her conversation with her former employer).
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law [ ... ] prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech"); see also Grutzmacher v.
Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 345-46 (4th Cir. 2017) (describing how a public employee's
use of an offensive image to refer to his employer sowed dissension and disharmony
within the workplace); See also Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 414 (4th
Cir. 2016) (finding disciplinary measures taken against two police officers accused of
violating department social media policy as impermissible).
12. See David Wright, Recent Cases Reflect Fact Specific Characterof Social Media
Cases, BAR BULLETIN (Jun. 15, 2017), http://www.msba.org/Bar Bulletin/2017/06 June/Recent Cases Reflect Fact Specific Character of Social Media Cases.aspx
(describing the fact specific character of social media cases and the conflicting outcomes
in private and public-sector Facebook disputes).
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may find it offensive.' 3 Part II describes the history of the First Amendment
speech protection, categories of exception, public employment speech
jurisprudence, and the troublesome nature of social media.'4 Part III
contends that current jurisprudence evaluates public employment speech as
primarily testimonial speech, but social media posts require a different
standard for analysis.' 5 Part IV recommends carving out a First Amendment
protection for opprobrious and offensive social media posts by evaluating it
as pure speech.' 6 Part V concludes by reiterating the need for a clear line of
First Amendment protections for public employees. 17
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The FirstAmendment and Speech

The First Amendment establishes the right to freedom of speech.' 8
However, the courts struggled with defining speech for First Amendment
purposes and established varying degrees of classification. 19
1.

Pure and Symbolic Speech

The First Amendment grants the highest protection to "pure speech."2
2
This protection extends to the publishing and disclosure of information. '

13. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that Cohen's jacket
emblazoned with "Fuck the draft" is protected speech because the First Amendment
applies to offensive speech); see also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)
(declaring that under the Constitution speech may not be prohibited because the ideas are
offensive to those who hear it).
14. See infra Part II (discussing protected speech, exceptions, and the Pickering
progeny).
15. See infra Part III (suggesting that Pickering progeny evaluate speech in its
testimonial capacity: it's ability to describe employee conditions as matters of public
concern).
16. See infra Part IV (recommending an evaluation of social media speech as a form
of expressive and symbolic speech).
17. See infra Part V (repeating the need for clear guidance on protected uses of social
media for public employees).
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (establishing a restriction against laws prohibiting or
abridging the exercise of free speech).
19. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1971) (explaining that Cohen falls
outside the range of prior cases restricting forms of individual expression "upon a
showing that such a form was employed").
20. See Pure Speech, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining pure

speech as "words or conduct limited in form to what is necessary to convey the idea.").
21. See Bartnickiv. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001) (declaring acts of 'disclosing'
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The Supreme Court also recognized the importance of symbolic speech, such
as waving a red flag as an emblem of governmental opposition, wearing
armbands in school to protest the Vietnam war, and attaching the peace sign
to an upside-down American flag.22 In those instances, the Court
emphasized the importance of the First Amendment as a check against prior
restraints on speech. 23 A prior restraint is a suppression of speech based on
its content.24 The courts have held that any imposition of a prior restraint
bears "a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity" and is subject
to strict scrutiny. 25 When a restriction is content-based, the government must
26
prove the regulation is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. 27
Otherwise, the restriction risks chilling potential speech before it happens.
However, prior restraints may pass strict scrutiny if it restricts speech outside
First Amendment protection.2 8
2.

Offensive and UnpopularSpeech
There is no unlimited right to free speech. 29 The First Amendment does

and 'publishing' information constitute pure speech).
22. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 405-06 (1974) (invalidating a
Washington statute forbidding the display of a U.S. flag with any superimposed words
or imagery); see also Tinker v. Des Moines, Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 50506 (1969) (wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam war ruled as protected speech); see
also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931) (invalidating criminal
prohibition on waving a red flag as an emblem of opposition).
23. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 557 (1976) (quoting Patterson v.
Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)) (stating that First Amendment
serves to prevent "previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other
governments").
24. See United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 2005) (defining prior
restraint as a regulation that suppresses speech based on the speech's content at the
discretion of a government official).
25. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (holding Rhode
Island commission on obscenity imposed unconstitutional restraint on speech because it
was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest).
26. See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 490 (1995)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (claiming majority misapplied strict scrutiny by prohibiting
honoraria ban for government employees).
27. See id. at 468 (holding that potential chilling effect on speech increases
government's burden).
28. See Neb. Press Ass 'n, 427 U.S. at 590 (describing unprotected speech as an
exception to prior restraint prohibition).
29. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (stressing that the First
Amendment's freedom of speech does not grant an authority that protects all uses of
language, nor does it prohibit the punishment of a person who abuses the freedom).
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not protect fighting words, obscenity, incitement of illegal action, or criminal
speech. 0 Yet, the Court allows room for speech that many consider
offensive and intolerable."
Conversely, political speech and speech on
matters of public concern receive strict scrutiny, and the government requires
a compelling reason to restrict those categories of speech because they are
content-based restrictions.12 A content-based restriction limits speech that
falls within certain categories, for example, a social media policy prohibiting
disparagement of an employer. 3 These limitations become more apparent
in the context of public employment disputes.34
B.

FirstAmendment and Public Employment

The First Amendment provides free speech protections to public, not

35
private, employees because it functions as a limit on government actions.
Due to its interest in operating efficiently, the government has more authority

30. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (establishing a three-prong
test for determining obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding
that speech inciting imminent lawlessness and violence lacks protection); Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (finding no First Amendment
protection for speech for conduct in violation of a criminal statute); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (defining "fighting words" as words likely to elicit
a violent response from the average person).
31. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (arguing certain unpleasant
speech allows for open debate in society); see also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,
592 (holding against suppressing the public expression of ideas because of its
offensiveness).
32. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453-55 (2011) (granting First Amendment
protection to picketers at a military funeral because their targeted signs "spoke to broader
public issues"); see generally Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81
(1998) (holding that the government cannot use Title VII to create a general code of
civility).
33. See Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 414 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding
Police Department's social networking policy unconstitutionally broad because of
provision outlawing negative posts about employer).
34. See Esha Bhandari, Government Employees Get to Have Opinions, Too,
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/freespeech/employee-speech-and-whistleblowers/government-employees-get-haveopinions-too (providing a general overview of the circumstances where public employee
speech gains First Amendment protection).
35. See David L. Hudson Jr., BalancingAct: Public Employees and FreeSpeech, 3
FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., no 2, at 2 (Dec. 2002), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/
wp-content/uploads/2014/09/fac firstreportApublic-employees-free-speech.pdf
(describing the First Amendment as a limiting factor which governs the circumstances
under which public employers may discipline employees for their speech).
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to regulate the speech of its employees.3 6 As a result, courts traditionally
viewed public employment as a privilege which allowed employers to
discipline an employee for any type
of speech; a view eventually rejected by
7
the Supreme Court in Pickering.1
1.

Pickering and its Progeny

The First Amendment includes the right to speak without fear of
government retaliation, even if the speaker has no entitlement to the benefit
in the first place.38 This right to be free from retaliation is not the only
interest at stake; the government also has a legitimate interest in ensuring the
efficient operation of the workplace.3 9 In Pickeringv. Board of Education,
a teacher challenged his retaliatory termination after a local newspaper
published his letter criticizing the superintendent of his school and the school
board's allocation of financial resources. 40 The Court held that the letter
constituted protected speech because Pickering's interest in commenting on
matters of a public concern outweighed the state's interest in regulating his
speech.4' In Connick v. Myers, the Court added a threshold requirement that
speech must relate to matters of public concern.42 In Connick, a public
employee distributed an office survey on working conditions during work

36. See id. (clarifying that the First Amendment may or may not protect the job of a
public employee who speaks critically of his or her employer if a reviewing court finds
the speech disruptive).
37. See id. at 4 (elaborating on the early twentieth century view that employees were
free to leave their jobs if they were unhappy with their conditions and that government
employment is not a constitutional right).
38. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (quoting Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-6 (1967) (declaring "the theory that public
employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions ... has
been uniformly rejected"); see also United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194,
210 (2003) (stating that the government may not deny a constitutionally provided benefit
even if the bearer's status is in dispute).
39. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (formulating test where employee's interest in
speaking as a citizen on a 'matter of public concern' is weighed against the government's
interest in 'promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs').
40. See id. at 566-67 (recalling Pickering's criticism of the school board's misuse of
taxpayer funds).
41. See id. at 571-72 (reasoning that statements in the letter were matters of public
concern because they criticized the school board's decisions in allocating taxpayer
money).
42. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-48 (1983) (finding a matter of public
concern when the content, form, and context of a given statement "relating to any matter
of political, social, or other concern to the community") (emphasis added).
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hours. 43 The Court established a time, place, and manner restriction within
its analysis of Connick when it held that the survey did not constitute a matter
of public concern.44 As a result, the Court concluded that the employee's
termination did not violate the First Amendment because the employee's
interest in speaking is minimal.4 5
Recently, the Court employed a narrow interpretation of "citizen" in
Garcetti v. Ceballos when it held that an employee speaking pursuant to an
official duty falls outside First Amendment protection. 46 In Garcetti,Deputy
District Attorney Ceballos claimed that his employer retaliated against him
after he recommended a dismissal for a case because of the government's
misconduct in obtaining a warranty. The Court held that Ceballos's speech
lacked First Amendment protection because he spoke in his capacity as a
''prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best
to proceed with a pending case."'48 Consequently, this holding raises the
novel issue of how to determine whether an employee is acting pursuant to
her duties. 4 9 The Court in Garcetti argued that the test is "a practical one"
and focuses on "the duties an employee actually is expected to perform."50
The Court carved a narrow exception in Lane v. Franks,when it protected
employee speech made during compelled testimony.5' Most recently, the
Court in Heffernan v. City of Patersonreintroduced the idea of evaluating an
employer's motive in retaliation when it held that an employer's mistaken

43. See id. at 141 (soliciting views on the office transfer policy, employee morale,
and perceived pressures to work on political campaigns).
44. See id. at 153-54 (noting that the questionnaire was a personal grievance
distributed in a disruptive time, place, and manner).
45. See id. at 154 (stating that the employee's speech interest was minimal because
the majority of the questionnaire was a personal grievance against an office transfer
policy).
46. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that public
employees speaking "pursuant to their official duties" are not speaking as private
citizens, they are speaking as employees and employers are free to discipline them).
47. See id. at 413-15 (describing Ceballos's testimony on the events that led to his
termination).
48. See id. at 421 (denying protection because Ceballos spoke as a public employee,
not as a private citizen).
49. See id. at 424-25 (declining to establish a general framework of employee duties
because it is a fact specific analysis).
50. See id. (arguing that analysis requires looking at the expectations surrounding an
employee's duties).
51. See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) (holding that employee speech
made during trial is protected citizen speech).
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belief did not shield him from liability.52 As a result of these narrow
restrictions, a large swath of public employee speech falls outside the scope
of the First Amendment.
2.

PublicEmployment and Social Media Use

Public employment social media cases range from employees losing their
jobs for making insensitive Facebook posts to retaliation claims for
collective action.53 Often, these cases begin when a viewer draws the
employer or the general public's attention to the objectionable content in an
attempt to shame the poster of the content.54 Ultimately, the degree of
protection employees have depends on the nature of their employment and
the specific facts of the case.5 5 Public sector employment cases remain
subject to the Pickering-Connicktest, even in the context of social media
use. 56 A recent court case questioned whether a Facebook "Like" is
protected speech.5 The Fourth Circuit is at the forefront of cases pertaining
to public employment and speech. 58 The court in Berger v. Battagliaheld
52. See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016) (determining
that an employer's motive matters in a retaliation claim when a supervisor demoted a
police officer after he saw him carrying a campaign sign for a mayoral candidate).
53. See Daniel Holloway, CBS Fires Legal Exec Over Las Vegas Shooting
Comments, VARIETY (Oct. 2, 2017), http://variety.com/201I7/tv/news/cbs-fires-legalexec-las-vegas-1202578075/ (showing that a lawyer was fired after criticizing shooting
victims on Facebook); see also Alan Levins, NLRB Rules Employer's Termination of
Non-Union Employees for Facebook Posts Violated NLRA, LITTLER (Dec. 27, 2012),
https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/nlrb-rules-employer / E2 / 80 /
99s-termination-non-union-employees-facebook-posts (reporting a National Labor
Review Board action finding non-union employer's termination of employees for
Facebook posts unlawful because their social media use was concerted action).
54. See SUE SCHEFF & MELISSA SCHORR, SHAME NATION: THE GLOBAL EPIDEMIC OF

ONLINE HATE 9-10 (2017) (arguing that people, when outraged, feel entitled to share
social media posts to their social network in order to shame behavior that they find rude,
crass, and inappropriate).
55. See Wright, supra note 12 (describing the fact specific character of social media
cases and the conflicting outcomes in private and public-sector Facebook disputes).
56. See Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 407 (4th Cir. 2016)
(determining that the traditional Pickering-Connick analysis applies to regulations on
social media use); see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 85 (2004) (holding
that police officer's off duty sex videos were too disruptive under Pickeringbecause the
employee intentionally sought a link between his conduct and his status as a police
officer).
57. See Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604 (E.D. Va. 2012) (finding
Facebook "Likes" are not protected speech).
58. See Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2017) (ruling that
employer interests outweighed employee's speech claims), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 171
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that public employees retain a First Amendment right to artistic expression
even if that expression is crude or vulgar.5 9 Most recently, in Grutzmacher
v. Howard County, the court refused to extend First Amendment protection
to a volunteer paramedic's offensive Facebook posts in an employer
retaliation claim. 60 First Amendment retaliation claims, where an employee
argues wrongful termination due to the exercise of protected speech, often
fail due to the threshold requirements of Pickering-Connickand Garcetti.
II.
A.

ANALYSIS

By Using a Myopic Focus on Testimony, Pickering and Progeny
Improperly Restrict Public Employee Speech

Pickering and its progeny focus on the testimonial capacity of public
employee speech as demonstrated by the importance these cases place on the
veracity of the statements made. 6' In Pickering, the Court refused to
establish a general standard for evaluating critical statements made by
teachers and public employees; instead, it left a tentative framework as a
guideline.62 The Court examined "testimony" as firsthand knowledge of
topics such as work conditions, politics, or other areas of public concern with
a strong focus on the usefulness of the speech's content: it must inform the
public of issues that require attention. 63 Based on this approach, the Court

determined Pickering's termination was unconstitutional for two key
reasons: (1) he wrote as a private citizen on a matter of public concern; and
(2) as a teacher, Pickering was best equipped to speak on these issues. 64 The
(2017); see also Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 414 (4th Cir. 2016)
(holding Police Department's social networking policy unconstitutional and disciplinary
measures impermissible).
59. See Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1000 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating public
employees retain a First Amendment right to uncensored artistic expression even if it is
vulgar or profane).
60. See, e.g., Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 348 (holding the employer's interests
outweighed the employee's free speech claims).
61. See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014) (clarifying that a public
employee's truthful testimony on matters outside the scope of employment is protected
employee speech); see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968)
(asserting that absent proof of lying, an employee may exercise his or her right to speak
on issues of public importance).
62. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569 (holding that the creation of a general standard
for analysis is inappropriate and unfeasible).
63. See id. at 572 (describing Pickering and teachers as best qualified to speak on
school funding and operation and more likely to inform public debate).
64. See id. (arguing that Pickering was speaking as a private citizen on a subject he
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Court evaluated his letter as testimony on budget concerns. 65 Further, the
Court focused its analysis on balancing the need for the information provided
by his letter against the potential disruption to his workplace. 66 Pickering's
experience and background served as the deciding factor because the Court
found his perspective well-informed, truthful, and credible. 6 Through
Pickering and Connick, the Court implicitly argued that only qualified,
testimonial speech deserves First Amendment protection because of its
usefulness and ability to inform public debate.
Subsequent cases focus on employee speech in its testimonial capacity
when they refer to speech on matters of public concern. 6' By defining
matters of public concern as any matter of political, social, or other concern
to the community, the Court sets a broad range of acceptable topics as
protected employee speech, provided the "testimony" is useful. However,
few cases pass the threshold established in Connick because the Court made
a conscious effort to exclude trivial speech. 69 By limiting the scope of
protected speech to include matters that serve a testimonial role, the Court
sends the message that content and utility exclusively determine the scope of
First Amendment protection. Ultimately, the courts embraced a narrow
focus that is ill-equipped to handle social media use cases because it
wrongfully excludes employee speech that merits protection on other
grounds.
1. The Pickering-Connick Balancing Test by Design Encourages the
Government as Employer to Impermissibly Enforce ContentBased Speech
Restrictions
Courts have avoided creating a clear standard around employee speech for
fear of increased litigation. 70 It developed the Pickering-Connickbalancing
understood).
65. See id. (detailing the importance of free and open debate and the need for
informed employees to speak on matters without fear of retaliatory dismissal).
66. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (determining that Pickering's
interest in commenting on a legitimate matter of public concern rendered his termination
impermissible).
67. See Pickering,391 U.S. at 572-73 (establishing that erroneous statements made
by Pickering in his letter are not evidence of his inability to teach or inform public debate
as a private citizen).
68. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-48 (defining public concern as any matter that is
social, political, or of general concern to the public).
69. See id. at 154 (holding that an employee survey is trivial and did not rise to the
level of a public concern).
70. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S.
at 154) (establishing that the First Amendment does not grant public employees the right
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test to filter out unwanted cases. 7 1 However, the underlying rationale behind
the threshold inquiry of the Pickering-Connicktest is content based, because
the inquiry begins with the question, "do people care?"' 72 The Court focuses
on whether the general public cares about the issue raised in the employee's
message. If the answer is no, then the Court will end its analysis and reject
the employee's claim in its entirety because the employee did not speak on
a matter of public concern. The next step in the balancing test asks, "do
people care enough to disrupt government employer operations? ' The
balancing aspect lies in determining whether the employee's interest in
speaking outweighs the government's interest as an employer. 76 The
employee's interest is in speaking on certain topics without fear of losing her
job; conversely, the government's interest as an employer is maintaining an
efficient work environment.
Consequently, the Court defers substantially
to the government's determination of whether speech causes a disruption and
does not require the government to prove actual disruption. 7 8 However, the
test, by design, encourages content restrictions on government employee
speech which cannot pass strict scrutiny.

to "constitutionalize the employee grievance" and that courts do not exist to manage
personnel).
71. See id.(describing the Court's refusal to evaluate every potential employment
grievance arising from speech).
72. SeePickeringv. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (formulating atest where
employee's interest in speaking as a citizen on a 'matter of public concern' is weighed
against the government's interest in 'promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs').
73. See id. at 571-72 (declaring that the general public cares about the school board's
use of tax money).
74. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-47 (finding that Myers spoke only on matters of
personal interest).
75. See id. at 146-47 (noting that government employers need a significant degree of
control over their employees for the efficient provision of public services and any discord
generated by employee speech impacts efficiency).
76. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (outlining the goals of the
balancing test).
77. See id. (stating that the employer restrictions must be directed at speech that has
some potential to affect employer operations).
78. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 152 (holding the employer can act before workplace
disruption appears); see also Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir.
2017) (quoting Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 1992)) (emphasizing
that a government employer does not need to prove workplace disruption, only that it
was "reasonable to be apprehended").
79. See Connick,461 U.S. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The standard announced
by the Court suggests that the manner and context in which a statement is made must be
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First, by stipulating that a matter of public concern is "any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community," the Court shifts the
focus of its analysis to the content of the employee speech and the reaction
it generates.80 In his dissent in Connick, Justice Brennan warned against this
approach because it forced judges to make the difficult determination of
whether an employee's speech informs public debate, which is a decision
better left to the general public. 8' The First Amendment provides for the
82
protection of speech that informs public debate in the marketplace of ideas.
Whether through judges or as an employer, the government cannot decide
the importance of an individual's speech, because to do so would violate the
First Amendment's prohibition against content-based restraints.83
True to Brennan's criticism, the threshold requirement established in
Connick provides an "out" for courts wishing to avoid these cases.14 As a
result, speech on certain newsworthy subjects such as politics, race, or
religion pass the first prong of the test.85 However, the balancing scale
weighs heavily in favor of government employers if the subject matter
generates controversy.
This is because if an employee expresses an
unpopular or offensive viewpoint, she risks losing her job even when she is
commenting on a matter of public concern.8 6 The heightened visibility of
social media, anonymity of internet users, and collective outrage surrounding
unpopular viewpoints foster an environment where employers react to the

weighed on both sides of the Pickering balance").

80. See id. at 159-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court because it
arbitrarily creates two classes of public concern as determined by the content of the
speech).
81. See id. at 164-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the general public should
determine whether speech is useful, not the courts).
82. See Hudson, supra note 35 at 3 (arguing that the First Amendment rejects

viewpoint discrimination because it limits the scope of the marketplace of ideas).
83. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (asserting that the First
Amendment exists to prevent the arbitrary restraint on speech and publication that
existed in tyrannical governments).
84. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 165 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (warning against

artificially restricting the concept of public concern because it goes against the "public's
important interests").

85. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004) (stating that public
concern includes subjects of legitimate news interest).

86. See Jeannette Cox, A Chill Around the Water Cooler: FirstAmendment in the
Workplace,

INSIGHTS ON LAW & SOCIETY, WINTER

2015 https://www.americanbar.org/

publications/insights on law andsociety/15/winter-2015/chill-around-the-watercooler.html (clarifying limited employee speech protection and its chilling effect on
discussing controversial topics at work).
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slightest controversy. 8 7 Under the current framework, unpopular employee
speech barely passes the first prong of the test if courts find the speech
frivolous. Presumably under Pickering, a teacher's observations on
childrearing and discipline are matters of public concern if the public needs
to know the information and the speaker is qualified to comment on the
subject.88 Yet, Jennifer O'Brien attempted the same argument and lost
because of the disruption caused by the negative publicity associated with
her comment.89 In O'Brien's experience, her comments attracted negative
media attention, increased hostility from parents, and disrupted the school's
relationships with the community relations. 90 However, the court still erred
because it broke from the spirit of Pickering when it denied O'Brien's First
Amendment protections under the balancing test. The underlying rationale
of Pickering is that the First Amendment exists to prevent government
employers from retaliating against employee speech that offends them. 91
The qualified testimony requirement established by the Pickering progeny
limits the scope of protected speech and increases the discretionary power of
government employers because it gives them license to determine the worth
of employee speech and punish such speech. 92 In essence, the extreme
deference given to government employers compromises the balancing test.93
If the employee speech generates negative publicity, and there is a risk of
employer disruption, the courts will use those factors to justify government
employer retaliation. 94 For the purposes of employee speech rights, the focus
on testimony limits the scope of First Amendment protections because it
creates a qualification requirement for speech protection.
87. See Scheff, supra note 54, at 107 (explaining how employers in general overreact
to unpopular online viewpoints out of a fear of attribution).
88. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968) (describing teachers
as most likely to have a well-formed opinion concerning their employment conditions).
89. See Ivers, supra note 8 (describing a teacher terminated for comparing her
student's lack of discipline and behavioral problems to that of future criminals).
90. See id. (commenting on the negative publicity caused by O'Brien's post and the
anger it generated within the Paterson community).
91. See Pickering,391 U.S. at 568 (detailing that teachers as government employees
do not have a duty of loyalty toward their employer and should not fear retaliation).
92. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983) (holding that an employer is
not required to prove actual disruption to the work environment).
93. See id. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S., at 574)
(arguing against extreme deference to employer judgment because the threat of
termination is a "potent means of inhibiting speech").
94. See Grutzmacherv. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2017) (stating that
employers need to prove a reasonable apprehension of disruption and that social media
platforms increase that risk).
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2. The Pickering-Connick StandardResults in an Uneven, Two-Tier
System of ProtectionBetween Privateand PublicEmployees in Social
Media Use Cases
Social media speech cases become problematic when the courts apply a
balancing test to the speech. 95 In Grutzmacher v. Howard County, in
response to news coverage on gun control, a fire department's Battalion
Chief posted on Facebook "My aide had an outstanding idea ... all kill
96
someone with a liberal ... then maybe we can get them outlawed too!
Grutzmacher, a volunteer paramedic, "liked" the post and replied "was it an
'assult liberal'? Gotta pick a fat one, those are the "high capacity" ones.
Oh... pick a black one, those are more "scary.
Buker, the battalion chief,
"liked" Grutzmacher's post and posted a response.9" The Fire Department
found the exchange repugnant, for reasons aside from grammar and spelling,
and terminated Buker's employment because he violated the Fire
Department's conduct and social media policy. 99 Buker challenged the
Department's social media policy as a vague and overbroad prior restraint
on speech that infringed on his ability to speak on matters of public
00
concern.
Ultimately, the court erred when it made its Pickering-Connick
determination before analyzing the social media policy argument because
the court broke with precedent established in UnitedStates v. Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union.1 1 The Court in NTEU, recognized that because of the
potential chilling effect of a speech regulation, the Pickering-Connicktest

95. See Wright, supra note 12 (explaining conflicting outcomes between private and
public employment Facebook disputes).
96. See Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 338 (describing Buker's initial post on gun control
and subsequent posts criticizing Department's social media policy as vague).
97. See id. (providing the quote that resulted in Buker's and Grutzmacher's
termination).
98. See id. (describing Buker's response to Grutzmacher's post on Facebook).
99. See id. at 337 (describing social media policy as prohibiting personnel from
posting "any statements, endorsements, or other information, images or personnel
matters that could reasonably be interpreted to represent or undermine the views or
positions of the Department" and "off-duty activities that may impugn the reputation of
the Department or any member").
100. See id. at 348 (stating Buker's challenge of social media policy and assertion of
third party standing in response to district court's dismissal of his facial challenge as
moot).
101. See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995)
(holding that a government employer has a higher burden to justify a prior restraint on
speech and must prove real disruption).
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requires proof of actual harm. 10 2 An employer must prove a disruption of
the work environment in order to justify a prior restraint on speech because
unlimited discretion creates the risk for an oppressive workplace. 103
However, the court in Grutzmacher erred when it refused to weigh the
department's social media policy as a prima facie issue because the fire
department revised
its social media policy during litigation rendering the
4
issue moot.

10

Under the Pickering threshold inquiry, the court must determine whether
the challenged speech discusses matters of public concern. 105
In
Grutzmacher,the court used a totality of the circumstances test to accurately
conclude that some of Buker's posts met the first prong of the test because
10 6
issues of gun control are matters of public concern and are newsworthy.
Ultimately, he failed the second prong of the test because the court found his

subsequent posts criticizing his employer disruptive to workplace efficiency,
which included a post where he "liked" an image of an old woman flashing
the middle finger and commented "for you Chief'. 10 7 In reaching its
decision, the court erred when it focused on the insubordinate nature of his
posts and the paramilitary structure of the fire department instead of the
social media policy. 108 By failing to address the department's broad social
media policy as it applied to Buker, the court failed to weigh his rights
because a broad social media policy prohibiting any speech that may reflect
negatively on the employer warrants strict scrutiny. 0 9 In Grutzmacher, the

102. See id. (stating that a burden on expression requires a reasonable belief that actual
harm will result from the exercise of free speech).
103. See id. (advocating for a strict scrutiny approach because chilling speech is an
extreme response).
104. See Grutzmacher,851 F.3d at 349 (describing how fire department revised social
media policy to remove prohibitions on private account use rendering Buker's claim
moot).
105. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (outlining balancing test
as: (1) determining whether speaker is private citizen commenting on matter of public
concern; (2) balancing speaker's speech rights against government's interest in
maintaining order; (3) granting protection if speaker's rights outweigh disruption).
106. See Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 344 (holding that Buker passed the first prong
because gun control is a matter of public concern).
107. See id. at 345-46 (holding that employee speech led to "dissension and
disharmony" within the fire department).
108. See id. at 347 (quoting Maciariellov. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 1992))
at 347 (stating Buker's conduct upset his superior and that fire departments operate as
"paramilitary organizations in which 'discipline is demanded, and freedom must be
correspondingly denied').
109. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (holding that restraints
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manner in which he conducted himself combined with the deference given
0
to his employer defeated his First Amendment claim.°"
However, due to the pervasiveness of social media and the reticence of the
Supreme Court in establishing clear guidance on First Amendment speech
protections, inconsistent results appear in private and public employment
court cases."' In the private sector, the National Labor Review Board
(NLRB) determined that an employee's crude and offensive Facebook post
about his employer constituted protected concerted activity." 2 The Board
emphasized that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) establishes
certain protections against unlawful retaliation for employee speech deemed
concerted activity. 113 Contrasting the protected expletive laden statement
with unprotected public employee speech, such as "I feel as if I'm teaching
future criminals," demonstrates the limits of current employee speech
jurisprudence in the public sector." 4 Under current jurisprudence, speech
designated "concerted activity" is protected in the private sector. 115
Moreover, the panel in NLRB held that the insubordinate and
"opprobrious" nature of the employee's speech did not diminish his
protection under the NLRA.116 Yet, the key difference between Buker and
the Pier Sixty employee, Perez, both with similar levels of coarse and
insubordinate speech, is that the phrase "vote yes for the union" grants the
speech greater protection under the NLRA than similar speech under the
First Amendment. 17
on free expression warrant strict scrutiny).
110. See Grutzmacher,851 F.3d at 348 (holding that Buker's First Amendment claims
failed the balancing test).
111. See NLRB v. Pier Sixty, LLC, 855 F.3d 115, 117-18 (2nd Cir. 2017) (holding
that employee Facebook post criticizing his employer as "a NASTY MOTHER
FUCKER don't know how to talk to people!!!!!! Fuck his mother and his entire fucking
family!!!! ... Vote YES for the UNION!!!!!!!" is protected speech).
112. See id at 122-24 (stating that concerted activities are those for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid).
113. See id. at 122 (stating that the NLRA prohibits employers from discharging an
employee for concerted or union-related activity).
114. See Ivers, supra note 8 (referencing NJ teacher who was fired for complaining
about her class).
115. See NLRB, 855 F.3d at 122 ("Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees employees the
right to 'engage in ... concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection."').
116. See id. at 125-26 (holding that the employee's egregious speech did not strip him
of NLRA protection).
117. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (emphasizing that a limited
First Amendment interest does not require an employer to tolerate disruptive activity).
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Although the NLRA explicitly protects concerted activity, the NLRB panel
used the same reasoning as the Court in Pickering."8 For the panel, an
employer can not punish his employee for using protected speech that is
opprobrious and offensive. 119 This inconsistent application of employee
speech protection results in a two-tiered system of justice for public and
private employees.120 Aside from issues of equity, the First Amendment
rests on the premise that society operates as a marketplace of ideas and
restrictions on speech require compelling justifications. 121
The court made numerous attempts to reconcile these tensions when it held
22
certain classes of public employees to an even higher standard of behavior.1
Based on this standard, employees with public contact such as teachers, fire
fighters, and police officers lack protection because offensive speech erodes
public confidence. 123 Initially, an employee within these categories could
maintain speech protection if she could prove that she was speaking as a
private citizen on a matter of public concern. 124 However, the Court in
Garcetti reduced protection because it is harder to draw the line between
action taken as a private citizen and action taken as pursuant to his official
duties.125 The Court in Garcetti refused to establish a framework defining
the scope of employee duties which raised the issue of whether an
employee's private use of her home computer, social media account, and
skillset preclude her from obtaining First Amendment protection. 126 The
Court's rigid insistence on a subset of testimonial speech results in the rolling

118. See NLRB, 855 F.3d at 124 (noting that the subject matter of Perez's speech
included workplace concerns); see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968) (finding that the First Amendment protects employee speech made as a private
citizen on matters of public concern).
119. See NLRB, 855 F.3d at 124 (holding that the offensive nature of Perez's speech
did not strip him of his rights).
120. See Wright, supra note 12 (chronicling disparate outcomes of employee speech
cases).
121. See Hudson, supra note 35 at 3 (arguing that the First Amendment prevents the
government from enacting viewpoint discrimination).
122. See Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 346 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting
McEvoy v. Spencer, 124 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 1997)) (stipulating that the "more the
employee's job requires ... public contact, the greater the state's interest in firing her for
expression that offends her employer... ").
123. See id. (describing the diminished speech expectation of public contact
employees).
124. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (describing the first prong of the balancing test).
125. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006) (noting the lack of a
comprehensive framework for employee duties in retaliation cases).
126. See id. (repeating the Court's ambivalence toward establishing guidelines).
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back of First Amendment employment law gains and the arbitrary
application of law.
The ruling in Pickering began as a continuation of a series of cases
rejecting the view that government employment is a privilege; it advanced
the claim that the government as an employer cannot condition employment
on the forfeiture of individual rights. 127 However, the Court distorted this
standard in Connick out of a misplaced fear that increasing employee
protections would increase the amount of frivolous First Amendment
cases. 128 Since then, the balancing test aims to exclude as many of these
cases as possible and defer to the judgment of government employers. As a
result, there are few instances
where a public employee is successful in a
29
First Amendment claim. 1
Social media posts complicate matters further because the speech
conveyed may fall into categories of speech outside the narrow parameters
of the Pickering-Connick test. 130 For example, unpopular and offensive
social media posts from employees are denied First Amendment protection
under Pickering-Connickbecause they are either too disruptive or outside
the scope of public concern. 131 Yet, unpopular and offensive speech still
warrants First Amendment protection.132 A perfect illustration of this tension
is considering what would happen if Paul Robert Cohen is tagged in a
Facebook post wearing his "Fuck the Draft" jacket, as a government
employee. 133 The Court held that his jacket warranted protection under the

127. See Pickering,391 U.S. at 568 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 605-06 (1967)) (emphasizing that the government as an employer cannot use the
threat of termination to compel employee speech).
128. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (restating the Court's fear of
becoming the final arbiter of petty employment grievances).
129. See Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 414 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding
that the Police Department's social networking policy violated the officer's First
Amendment rights); see also Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1000 (4th Cir. 1985)
(holding that the police officer's blackface performance was protected).
130. See Liverman, 844 F.3d at 408 (emphasizing that a social media policy
prohibiting speech may affect the public interest when it limits the sharing of
information).
131. See Grutzmacherv. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 345-46 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding
that the plaintiffs social media posts lacked protection because he disrupted his work
environment).
132. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18, 21 (1971) (holding that Cohen's jacket
is protected speech); see also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (declaring
that the First Amendment protects offensive speech).
133. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (emphasizing that the presence of potential witnesses
and listeners does not justify limiting speech).
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First Amendment because of the expressive message it contained. 3 4 If the
message is protected under the First Amendment, it should follow that a
social media post with the same imagery would be protected as well.
Under the Pickering-Connick balancing test, Cohen would pass the
threshold inquiry if he can prove he was speaking as a private citizen because
the draft is a newsworthy subject of public concern. The next question is
whether the government has a strong interest in suppressing his right to speak
on that issue. Given the deference provided to a government employer's
interest in avoiding disruption, Cohen's Facebook post would likely not
enjoy protection under Pickering-Connick because of the controversy it
could generate. The same would apply to Juli Briskman under the current
balancing test standard. These posts should be evaluated as pure speech
because they express unpopular viewpoints in the marketplace of ideas that
the First Amendment protects.
B.

FacebookPosts arePure Speech for the Purposes of the PickeringConnick Balancing Test and Merit the Highest Protection

The Supreme Court recently addressed the relationship between the First
35
Amendment and social media in Packingham v. North Carolina.'
The
Court, in striking down a restrictive statute, argued that "social media users
employ these websites to engage in a wide array of protected First
Amendment activity."' 3 6 In light of this recognition, one solution to the
inconsistencies caused by Pickering-Connick social media analysis is to
consider online speech as pure speech. Facebook by definition is a platform
built on the convergence of different viewpoints and the conveying of
particular messages. 137
The Fourth Circuit explored the relationship between Facebook "likes"
and employee speech in Bland v. Roberts when it dismissed an employee
retaliation claim.'38 In Bland, six former sheriff's office employees brought

134. See id. (holding thatjacketmessage criticizing the draft is protected speech under
the First Amendment).
135. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (holding that
the "access to social media altogether is ...the legitimate exercise of First Amendment
rights").
136. See id. at 1735-36 (outlining the prevalence of social media use and its potential
for First Amendment activity).
137. See id. at 1737 (arguing that social media websites "provide perhaps the most
powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard").
138. See Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604 (E.D. Va. 2012) (holding
Facebook likes are not protected speech because they are not substantive enough,
compared to actual Facebook posts).
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suit against a sheriff for violating their First Amendment rights when he
terminated them after his reelection. 3 9 One of the employees, Carter,
claimed he was terminated because he clicked "like" on his employer's
political opponent's Facebook page. 140 After subjecting his claims to the
threshold inquiry of the Pickering-Connicktest, the court dismissed his claim
14 1
because a Facebook "like" is not substantive enough to constitute speech.
Conversely, the court implied that textual posts are substantive enough to
constitute speech since a social media post is closer to the forms of pure
speech allowed by the Court. A social media42post is visible, unambiguous,
and clearly conveys a message to the viewer. 1
The court in Bland illustrated the difficulty in interpreting the context of
speech in social media cases. 14 Moreover, the manner in which the court
hastily opted for the path of least resistance demonstrates the problem with
the current standard.144 The Pickering-Connicktest fails to protect employee
speech because courts avoid questioning employer motive. 145 In cases such
as Bland and Grutzmacher, the main source of conflict emerged from a social
media post that irritated a government employer. 146 The Government as an
employer chooses to regulate the content of speech and conditions continued
employment on public outcry. 147 The inconsistent outcomes of PickeringConnick result in a world where an employee's future hinges on whether
people care enough about her post to complain; ultimately, what the First

139. See id. at 602 (describing how sheriff office employees lost their jobs after
allegedly endorsing their employer's political rival).
140. See id. at 603 (elaborating upon Carter's claim that he was terminated because
he "liked" a sheriff candidate's Facebook page).
141. See id. at 604 (holding that a Facebook "like" is not substantive speech because
it does not directly convey a message and is too ambiguous to interpret).
142. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (emphasizing that Facebook users can
convey messages on religion and politics and directly engage with others).
143. See Bland, 857 F.Supp. at 604 (describing the difficulty in determining whether
a "like" falls into the category "speech" of prior cases).
144. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 165 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for modifying the Pickering test to avoid taking more cases).
145. See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016) (holding that the
Court should analyze an employer's motive in a retaliation claim when determining
whether the plaintiff s rights were violated).
146. See Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2017) (listing the
initial post that resulted in the terminations); see also Bland, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 603
(chronicling Carter's alleged Facebook activity that upset the employer).
147. See generally Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (rejecting the
premise that the government may condition employment on the forfeiture of rights and
pledging of loyalty).
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48

Amendment is designed to prevent. 1

1. The Government as an Employer Cannot Compel a General Code of
Civility by ConditioningContinuedEmployment on Compliance
The First Amendment enshrines a hallmark of American citizenship,
which is the ability to criticize without fear of reprisal. 149

The Court in

Pickering, reiterated the established doctrine that the government as an
employer cannot condition employment on the forfeiture of individual
rights. 50 Nevertheless, the Court held that the "content, form, and context
of a given statement" is subject to scrutiny in an employee speech dispute.' 5 '
Justice Brennan emphasized in his Connick dissent that the First Amendment
allows for the free exchange of ideas and robust debate. 5 2 Similarly in
Cohen v. California, the Court emphasized that free expression "removes
governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion," since it puts
"the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely in the hands of each of
us. '153 As a consequence of free expression and the instantaneous nature of
online communication, offensive and opprobrious speech is visible and
prone to drawing negative overreactions. 154 Yet, despite the controversy it
155
generates, offensive and opprobrious speech is still expressive speech.
The Court consistently holds that the government cannot police speech

148. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (declaring that the offensive
nature of ideas does not justify suppression of speech).
149. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,26 (1971) (quoting Baumgartner v. United
States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944) (emphasizing the importance of criticism, which
includes "not only informed criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without
moderation").
150. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (reiterating that the government cannot condition
employment on employee loyalty).
151. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (claiming that the content
of an employee's speech merits increased scrutiny by the courts before granting
protection).
152. See id. at 162 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (claiming the First Amendment expresses
commitment to uninhibited debate on public issues, which may include "sharp attacks
on government and public officials") (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan) (citation
omitted).
153. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (outlining the importance of free
expression to public discourse).
154. See Ronson, supra note 3 (describing executive's offensive tweet about Africa
and AIDS); see also Price, supra note 5, at 1-6 (recounting stories of Facebook posts
resulting in employee termination).
155. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (noting that offensive speech is protected under the
First Amendment).
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because it offends people. 5 6 Offensive speech is at the heart of the First
Amendment, and the government as an employer cannot compel a general
code of civility online or in person.15
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, the Supreme Court held that

the government as an employer cannot use Title VII provisions to create a
general code of civility.' 58 The Court reasoned that offensive and
contentious people will always exist in the workplace, and it is not the
government's responsibility to compel individuals to act as decent human
beings nor police human behavior. 5 9 The same reasoning should apply to
the government as an employer in the context of offensive Facebook and
Twitter posts. By using social media restrictions and disciplinary actions,
0
the government indirectly controls speech to curtail offensive behavior.16
The prohibition against a government employer compelling behavior
extends into the realm of social media use and employee speech through the
rejection of broad social media policies. 16' The Supreme Court in
Packingham held that the government cannot deny access to social media
platforms to citizens based on their status as sex offenders. 162 Although
Packingham addressed a general restriction on access to social media, the
Court's 63
reasoning still applies to broad restrictions on social media use and
access. 1

Social media policies specifically restrict speech when they prohibit

156. See id. at 25 (arguing certain unpleasant speech allows for open debate in
society); see also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (arguing against the suppression
of speech because it may offend others).
157. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (holding
that the government cannot use Title VII to create a general code of civility).
158. See id. (declining to expand the scope of Title VII workplace provisions).
159. See id. (holding that "[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create
an objectively hostile or abusive work environment an environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive is beyond Title VII's purview").
160. See Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 414 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding
the social networking policy unconstitutional because it chilled speech before it could
occur).
161. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (striking down
the broad N.C. statute banning access to social media platforms); see also Liverman v.
City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 414 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding the police department's
social networking policy unconstitutional and disciplinary measures impermissible).
162. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (striking down the N.C. statute prohibiting
sex offenders from registering on social media websites since social media use implicates
the First Amendment).
163. See id. at 1738 (holding that the State cannot apply broad restrictions on speech
in forums such as airports or the internet).
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critical and offensive speech on employers, employment conditions, and
speech that deserves First Amendment protection. 164 In the public
employment context, the Fourth Circuit specifically addressed the issue of
employee speech and social media policies in Liverman v. City of
Petersburg.16 5 In Liverman, two veteran police officers were terminated
after violating a department social media policy banning the spread of any
information that reflected "unfavorably upon the [Department].' ' 166 The
Police Department crafted its social media policy to meet the requirements
of the Pickering-Connick test. 16 7 Yet, the court held that the policy was
unconstitutionally overbroad because it operated as a prior restraint that
chills potential speech before it happens. 168 Based on the court's reasoning,
broad social media policies are analogous to prior restraints on speech
because of the potential of a social media policy to chill speech.169 A prior
restraint is unconstitutional because it prevents speech before it takes place,
a content based social media policy which does the same violates the First
Amendment. 170
When a government employer takes retaliatory action against an employee
because of her offensive social media post, the employer exercises a contentbased restriction on speech. It should follow that if it is unconstitutional for
the government as an employer to establish a broad policy outlawing
inflammatory speech on social media, then it is also impermissible to punish
an employee on the basis of her offensive speech. Both social media policies
and compelled employee speech are impermissible content-based
restrictions that punish speech before it occurs. The government as an
employer cannot compel employee behavior through retaliatory terminations
164. See Liverman, 844 F.3d at 414 (finding the Police Department's social
networking policy unconstitutionally broad because of a provision outlawing negative
posts about the employer).
165. See id. at 407 (stating that the scope and content of speech restrictions applies to
First Amendment analysis).
166. See id. at 404 (describing the Negative Comments provision of the police
department's social media policy).
167. See id. (elaborating upon the Public Concern Provision of the department's social
media policy which allowed officers to comment on matters of public concern so long as
they do not disrupt the workforce or undermine public confidence in the department).
168. See id. (quoting United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475)
at 407 (holding that for regulatory restraints on employee speech the government must
demonstrate real harm).
169. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (arguing that
restrictions on social media access and use chill speech before it occurs).
170. See Liverman, 844 F.3d at 409 (stating that the department "can craft a regulation
that does not have the chilling effects on speech that the Supreme Court deplored").
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or broad social media policies.
2. Social Media Posts are Matters of Public Concern Even When
Employees Operate Off Duty

The Court in City of San Diego v. Roe, touched on the idea of public
concern when it defined public concern as "a subject of legitimate news
interest" and of value to the general public. 17 ' The Court recognized that
certain private remarks, including negative comments about the President of
the United States, touch on matters of public concern. 17 2 When applying
prior Court doctrines to social media posts, the content of the post determines
whether it touches on matters of public concern. 17'This proves problematic
because political posts, humorous memes, petitions, and certain
forms of
174
concern.
public
of
ambit
the
outside
fall
may
commentary
social
However, the Fourth Circuit in Berger v. Battaglia carved out a potential
exception to the narrow testimonial approach to employee speech when it
granted protection for content that served no purpose other than
entertainment even "on matters trivial, vulgar, or profane.' 175 In Berger, the
court held that a police officer's off duty blackface performances is protected
under the First Amendment. 176The court ultimately construed Pickeringin
a manner where it presumed his performance held some value as a matter of
public concern, especially because it took place off duty. 177 In this instance,
the Fourth Circuit allowed for the inclusion of speech that is trivial, vulgar,
and profane, much like the speech found on Facebook and Twitter. 178 By
extending the court's logic, it should follow that an employee's off duty
Facebook activity may warrant protection for artistic, entertainment, and
171. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (holding that police
officer's off duty sex videos were detrimental to employer's efficiency under Pickering).
172. See id. (holding that negative comments about public figures fall into that
category).
173. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (finding that private
grievances and personal interests are not matters of public concern).
174. See id. at 154 (1983) (holding that employee survey was trivial and therefore not
a matter of public concern).
175. See Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1000 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding an off duty
cop's blackface performance is protected speech because a vulgar performance is still
artistic and expressive).
176. See id. at 993-994 (describing Berger's off duty blackface performance of late
singer Al Jolson).
177. See id. at 993 (holding that Berger's off duty performance held some vulgar and
artistic value).
178. See id. (establishing that vulgar speech and entertainment fall within the panoply
of First Amendment rights).
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symbolic purposes even if it is vulgar, crude, and distasteful. 179 A crude joke
on Facebook, a sarcastic quip on Twitter, and a viral image all hold some
form of value outside the narrow parameters of a Pickeringanalysis.
Yet, the same court in Grutzmacher, ultimately decided that a firefighter's
right to speak on gun rights on Facebook did not outweigh his employer's
right to run an efficient work environment. 80 The court used the Pickering
balancing test to determine that speech on gun rights is a matter of public
concern for First Amendment purposes; however, the court has established
a higher standard of expectations for employees that have heightened contact
with the public.' 8' Ultimately, the court treated these cases differently due
to the potential for workplace disruption. 8 2 In all likelihood, the fact that
Berger took place in the early 1990s before the use of social media decreased
the risk of viewers taking offense to his performances. The court in
Grutzmacher focused primarily on the grief caused by his insubordination
and deferred substantially to his employer's interests which illustrates the
need to provide protection for offensive speech.' 83
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
Public sector retaliation claims fail because the limiting constraints of
Pickering-Connicksubstantially increase the employee's burden of proof A
government employee must prove that, (1) she lost her job because of her
exercise of constitutionally protected speech, (2) her speech interests
outweigh her employer's interests, and (3) her speech was a substantial factor
in her termination. 8 4 However, she exclusively bears the burden of proof
for each step of the case. Moreover, the increased visibility of social media
posts renders employers hypersensitive to controversy and public
overreaction and therefore more reactionary."' As a result, the threshold
179. See id. at 1000 (commenting on the worth of unconventional forms of speech
and the value that they may hold in society).
180. See Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 348 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding
that the firefighter's conduct was too disruptive and insubordinate to outweigh his
employer's interests in efficiency).
181. See id. at 346 (holding that public employees with heightened contact with the
public are held to a higher standard because community trust is vitally important to the
employer's function).
182. See Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1001 (4th Cir. 1985) (insisting that the
mere threat of an angry response to an employee's speech is not enough to justify
employer retaliation).
183. See Grutzmacher, at 348 (finding that Buker's insubordinate behavior risked
undermining public confidence and was intolerable).
184. See id. at 342 (outlining requirements for a successful retaliation claim).
185. See Wright, supra note 7, at 1 (describing the risk of controversial and offensive
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inquiry narrows the scope of protected speech and risks a return to prePickeringemployment conditions where continued employment rests on the
forfeiture of individual rights and the suppression of unpopular viewpoints.
For social media cases, one possible solution lies in balancing the burdens
by rejecting the current Pickering-Connickstandard. The Court provided the
first step in Heffernon v. City of Paterson when it required analysis of an
employer's motive for retaliating against an employee. 8 6 Instead of
pretending otherwise, courts should determine whether the employer
terminated the employee because of the content of a social media post. Next,
if the employer retaliated against an employee for off duty social media
speech, courts should determine whether the speech falls outside of First
Amendment protections: obscenity, incitement to violence, and fighting
words.' 8 7 If it falls outside those categories, then the employee speech
warrants protection as pure speech. The burden then rests on the employer
to prove the speech lacks protection. An additional factor to consider
includes whether the employer established a restrictive social media policy.
If so, then strict scrutiny analysis applies.
It should not matter whether an employee's post is controversial,
opprobrious, or offensive because the First Amendment recognizes the
importance of unpopular speech and divergent viewpoints.' 88 Moreover,
modifying the approach taken toward analysis would not impact employers
adversely because the employer may still justify the termination under a
conduct policy violation. 89 First Amendment jurisprudence consistently
holds that the government may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoints
nor compel citizens to act as decent human beings.
In the interest of justice, it is not fair that private employees have a lower
social media posts for employees).
186. See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016) (stating that
employer motive is an important factor in determining a retaliation claim, even if mistake
of fact exists).
187. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (establishing a three-prong
test for determining obscenity); see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)
(holding that speech promoting lawless action lacks protection); see Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (finding no First Amendment protection for
speech used in violation of a criminal statute); see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (defining fighting words as words likely to "cause an average
addressee to fight.").
188. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (arguing certain unpleasant
speech allows for open debate in society).
189. See Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 412-13 (4th Cir. 2016)
(holding that employer investigation into an employee's job related conduct was not an
improper retaliation).
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standard or that a public-sector employer may terminate an employee
because of a disagreeable picture on Facebook. In the court of public
opinion, employees who create offensive social media posts are often
punished with impunity. The First Amendment encourages open debate in a
marketplace of ideas and always seeks to include more speech rather than
less.
CONCLUSION

This Comment argued that the current approach Courts take to free speech
claims are limited in the context of social media and that the Pickeringtest
implicitly applies to testimonial speech. When the Court applies a threshold
inquiry, it is simultaneously judging the content of the speech for its ability
to testify about conditions the public may have an interest in against the
possibility of employer disruption. The Court defers to the rights of the
employee when it is established that they are competent and speaking on
matters that are newsworthy. Conversely, if the Court finds the possibility of
disruption or if it deems the speech trivial, then the termination stands.
Instead of continuing a subjective system, Facebook speech should be
weighed for its content as pure speech. Such an approach allows for speech
that is offensive, opprobrious, and controversial to exist in the open
marketplace of ideas and is in line with Free Speech jurisprudence.
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